![]() ![]() There will be a pre-game planning exercise on the day, before carrying out operations over a two week period, before the Soviet Union becomes involved. It is designed to be as intuitive as possible, with little need to check rules once the game is up an running. The game will use an existing ruleset used for the recent Czech Mate '38 megagame, which focuses on command and control, as well as the assigning of logistic resources to support the main effort. ![]() Map players (up to a dozen per side) will act as German and Polish army and corps commanders, with blocks representing regiments. The Army needs a well-thought-out 6.8mm program, not an artless, politicized, and wasteful swing back to the other end of the caliber scale.An operational military game, set at the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, as Poland fights against a determined invader. The answer then is a “6.8mm-lite” or “NGSW-lite” program. Anything bigger will be onerous for both infantrymen and their weapon systems. Rather, it will need to find a median round with a bonafide 6.8mm class cartridge around the ninety-grain mark. Should the NGSW implode, the Army must not be discouraged and simply stick to the 5.56mm for the shame of trying. While the 5.56mm is too weak for the modern battlefield, the Army’s current 6.8mm “Franken-round” is far too strong to be used in modern combat. ![]() The Army nonetheless almost landed at its Goldilocks round-it only fell short when it couldn’t comprehend anything outside the biggest solution. Contrary to popular belief, the Army does not know its small-arms theory well, as the train of historical programmatic failures attests. ![]() Where the Army stumbled was in its insistence on using an in-house designed 6.8mm, 140-grain bullet to claim intellectual property ownership of the program. The real tragedy of the NGSW program is that the Army was so close to getting it right. This begs the question of why the Army can’t just land in the middle by developing a median round. By doubling the round weight and adding 50 percent to weapon weight in the NGSW, the Army has gone back to the future with a pre-Vietnam 7.62x51mm and 120-grain class approach to small-arms doctrine. In Vietnam, a smaller but more voluminous round-the 5.56mm at around sixty grains-was the best the Army could do to manage the war’s tactical equation. The lessons of Vietnam and Afghanistan represent a double-edged sword. The battles of Little Bighorn, the Chosin Reservoir, Mogadishu, Iraq, and Wanat-and the Global War on Terror itself-are replete with tactical stories that emphasize high-volume firefight methodologies requiring the same kind of capabilities seen in mountain engagements like those in Afghanistan. But unthinkingly swinging to the other end with the NGSW and preparing to fight the last war, where distance was the engagement issue, sets the stage for strategic suicide. The 5.56mm is indeed anemic for modern combat given the prevalence of chest rigs and armor plating designed for close-quarters, high-volume warfare like the fighting seen in Vietnam. What has been monumentally shocking about the post-Afghanistan strategic introspection is the recurrence of Vietnam syndrome, or simply erasing wartime experiences from the institutional memories of U.S. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |